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Acting "In Loco Parentis" as a Defense to
Assault and Battery
Norman D. Tripp*
AN OFFER TO USE FORCE to the injury of another is an assault,
6 and the use of that force is a battery, which usually in-
cludes an assault.' An assault and battery upon the person of
another may be a criminal act. Courts generally hold, how-
ever, that a parent or one in loco parentis may inflict disciplinary
corporal punishment upon a child without becoming criminally
liable. 2
It is recognized that the use of corporal punishment by a
parent or one in loco parentis does not, in itself, constitute an
assault and battery but is only the exercise of a legal right.3
If, however, the force applied or the confinement imposed upon
the child is primarily for a reason other than to correct, train, or
educate the child, then it is not privileged, even though it is
applied in an amount and on an occasion which otherwise would
be privileged. 4
Where one is in loco parentis, the rights, duties, and liabili-
ties of such person are the same as those of the lawful parent.5
One other than a parent, who has voluntarily assumed the func-
tion of controlling, training, or educating a child, is privileged
to apply reasonable force or confinement as he believes to be
reasonably necessary for the child's proper control, training, or
educationA
A parent may restrict this right of punishment in one to
whom he has entrusted his child, except in the case of a teacher
who acts in a public capacity.7 A parent may not withdraw the
right to use corporal punishment from a teacher.8
The courts are constantly faced with the question of de-
ciding whether a person is acting in loco parentis and, if so,
whether his acts are to be considered wrongful or privileged.
* B.A., Univ. of Miami (Fla.); Casualty Claims Adjuster; Fourth-year
student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Harris v. State, 15 Okl. Cr. 369, 177 P. 122 (1919).
2 Annot., 89 A. L. R. 2d 399 (1963).
3 Prosser, Law of Torts, 139 (3d Ed. 1964); 1 Wharton, Criminal Law and
Procedure 692-696 (12th Ed. 1957); Perkins, Criminal Law 878, 879 (1957).
4 Restatement (2d), Torts, Par. 151 (1965).
5 Leyerly v. United States, 162 F. 2d 79 (10th Cir. 1947); Perkins, op. cit.
supra n. 3.
6 Restatement (2d), Torts, Par. 147 (1965).
7 Id. at 147, 152, 153.
8 Id. at 153; Perkins, op. cit. supra n. 3.
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Persons In Loco Parentis
In Black's Law Dictionary,9 in loco parentis is defined as
follows:
In the place of a parent; instead of a parent; charged facti-
tiously with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities.
At common law, a relationship of in loco parentis arises by
intention, not by chance, and is not dependent on formal legal
adoption. 10 In order for such a relationship to exist, the person
standing in loco parentis must have intended to assume, without
formal legal approval or adoption proceedings, the duties and ob-
ligations of a parent. The relationship may arise if a person re-
ceives a child into his own family, undertaking the care and con-
trol of the child in the absence of its natural parents and holding
the child out to the world as a member of the family. The child
must remain in the home during this period although the rela-
tionship is intended to be only temporary and not permanent. 1
In Griego v. Hogan,12 the court stated that a relationship of
in loco parentis exists,
when a person undertakes the care and control of another
in the absence of such supervision by the latter's natural
parents and in the absence of formal legal approval. It is
temporary in character and not to be likened to an adoption,
which is permanent.
Whether the relationship of in loco parentis exists is a matter
of intention to be deduced- from the facts of the particular case.13
Financial responsibility for a child's support is a factor tending
to prove that the relationship exists. 14 Once established, the re-
9 Black, Law Dictionary 896 (4th Ed. 1951).
10 Niewiodowski v. United States, 159 F. 2d 683 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. den.,
67 S. Ct. 1730, 331 U. S. 850, 91 L. Ed. 1859 (1947); see also Lewis v. United
States, 105 F. Supp. 73 (N. D. W. Va. 1939); London Guarantee and Acc.
Co. v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 64 N. W. 2d 781 (1954). Both cases say that at
common law the person assumes parental obligations without adoption.
11 Miller v. United States, 123 F. 2d 715 (8th Cir. 1942), reversed on appeal
for procedural errors. 63 S. Ct. 192, 87 L. Ed. 179, 317 U. S. 192 (1942);
Horseman v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 522 (D. C. Mo. 1946). This case
stresses the question of intention; Bricault v. Deveau, 21 Conn. Supp. 486,
157 A. 2d 604 (1960). The court stressed assumption of the parental status
and discharging parental duties; Dix v. Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S. W.
133 (Mo. App. 1913). Stresses holding the child out to the world as being
a member of the family; Griego v. Hogan, 71 N. M. 280, 377 P. 2d 953
(1963). The court looks to the absence of supervision by the parents setting
up a situation of temporary custody; Mott v. Iossa, 119 N. J. Eq. 185, 181 A.
689 (N. J. Chancery 1935); Trotter v. Pollan, 311 S. W. 2d 723 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958).
12 Supra n. 11 at 295.
13 67 C. J. S., Person in Loco Parentis Generally, Par. 72 (1950).
14 Strauss v. United States, 160 F. 2d 1017 (2nd Cir. 1947), cert. den., 67
S. Ct. 1741, 331 U. S. 850, 91 L. Ed. 1859 (1947).
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IN LOCO PARENTIS DEFENSE
lationship continues and the one claiming discontinuance has the
burden of proving it.",
The relationship between a teacher and his pupil is one of
in loco parentis,16 and the relationship extends from the time the
child leaves his home until he has returned. 17 A superintendent
of city schools was held not to be in loco parentis to pupils under
a statute that said teachers stand in loco parentis. The court
construed the word teacher, as used in the statute, to mean
teachers only, and held that the legislature did not intend to
include superintendent within its meaning.' 8
Grandparents, as such, do. not stand in loco parentis to
grandchildren. 19 However, when the grandparents have exclusive
custody, control, and care of the grandchildren, they may then
stand in loco parentis to them.20
A brother or a sister, as such, does not stand in loco par-
entis, 21 and neither does a cousin. 22 However, a brother may, if
he so intends, place himself in the position of being the lawful
parent of his brothers and sisters. If they are completely de-
pendent on him, he will stand in loco parentis to them. 23
An individual authorized by a mother to raise and correct
the mother's child has been held to be in loco parentis to the
child.24 A guardian stands in loco parentis to his ward.25 Or-
dinarily a person cannot be in loco parentis to an adult who is
not mentally or physically incapacitated. 26 In Eitel v. State,27
15 Leyerly v. United States, supra n. 5; Hawkey v. United States, 108 F.
Supp. 941 (E. D. Ill. 1952).
16 Brooks v. Jacob, 139 Me. 371, 31 A. 2d 414 (1943); Roberson v. State, 22
Ala. App. 413, 116 S. 317 (1928).
17 Cleary v. Booth, 1 Q. B. 465 (1893); Perkins, op. cit. supra n. 3.
18 Prendergast v. Masterson, 196 S. W. 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917), rehear.
den. (1917). The court felt that a teacher has an opportunity to know the
student's traits, habits, and prior conduct and can more justly measure the
punishment delivered than could a superintendent.
19 Sutton v. Menges, 186 Va. 805, 44 S. E. 2d 414 (1947).
20 Austin v. Austin, 147 Neb. 109, 22 N. W. 2d 560 (1946).
21 United States v. Niewiodowski, supra n. 10.
22 Ibid.
23 Boyle v. Dealer's Transport Co., 184 Pa. Super. 38, 132 A. 2d 709 (1957).
A brother placed himself as the lawful father of minor brothers and sisters
of the half blood.
24 Harris v. State, 115 Ga. 578, 41 S. E. 983 (1902); Fortinberry v. Holmes,
89 Miss. 373, 42 S. 799 (1907). The mother claimed she told defendant not
to whip the child when she left him with the defendant. The court said if
the defendant was to support, educate, and care for the child, he stood in
loco parentis to the child and could punish him.
25 Beaver v. Williams, 194 Ga. 875, 23 S. E. 2d 171 (1942).
26 Howard v. United States, 2 F. 2d 170 (E. D. Ky. 1924).
27 78 Tex. Crim. 552, 182 S. W. 318 (1916). Guardian who forced ward to
leave his home and support herself could not justify an assault and battery
on her one year later by claiming to be in loco parentis.
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the court held that a guardian who made his ward leave the
guardian's home and live elsewhere and support himself, in ef-
fect emancipated him and ended the status of in loco parentis.
The fact of being a step-son, without more, is insufficient to
give rise to the relationship of in loco parentis. The existence of
such a relationship is a question of fact for the jury to decide.28
Where a child lived with a man with whom her mother had
maintained meretricious relations for some years, and the man
treated the child as his own, these facts would support a jury
finding of a relationship of in loco parentis, but would not estab-
lish the existence of such a status as a matter of law.
29
Once a defendant in an assault and battery case is found to be
standing in loco parentis to the plaintiff or complaining child, he
may then assert as a defense his privilege to use reasonable
force in discharging his responsibilities toward the child.
The In Loco Parentis Rule
Reasonable force for the correction or punishment of a
child may be used by a parent or one standing in the place of
the parent.30 Such a person is not liable for the use of reason-
able force which might otherwise be considered an assault and
battery if such a relationship did not exist.3 1 As stated earlier,
the courts must find and establish whether or not the person
claiming the protection of the rule is in loco parentis and there-
fore entitled to the privilege. If the person so charged is shown
to be in loco parentis to the person accusing him of the assault,
it then becomes a question of whether his act is one privileged
by the rule.
There is a majority and a minority opinion construing the
in loco parentis rule in the United States. The majority opinion
looks to the reasonableness of the defendant's act and considers
whether the person has willfully, wrongfully, and unlawfully as-
saulted the child.32  The minority view holds that unless
28 State v. Weber, 137 N. W. 2d 527 (Sup. Ct. Minn. 1965), rehear, den.
(1965).
29 Samborski v. Beck, 41 Pa. Dist. 387 (Phila. Cnty. 1941).
30 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 3.
31 Annot., 89 A. L. R. 2d 399 (1963).
32 State v. Hunt, 2 Ariz. App. 6, 406 P. 2d 208 (1965), the use of im-
moderate or excessive physical violence for correction is aggravated as-
sault; Hinkle v. State, 127 Ind. 490, 26 N. E. 777 (1891), the jury decides the
fact of reasonableness; Rowe v. Rugg, 117 Iowa 606, 91 N. W. 903 (1902);
State v. Straight, 136 Mont. 255, 347 P. 2d 482 (1959); State v. Koonse, 123
Mo. App. 655, 101 S. W. 139 (1907), rehear, den. (1907), the defendant made
a child walk five miles without shoes, while the defendant rode on horse-
back and struck the child with a whip. This was evidence of bad faith in
that the defendant's acts were not for the child's benefit; Clasen v. Pruhs,
69 Neb. 278, 95 N. W. 640 (1903), punishment must be reasonable and
moderate; Moreno v. State, 114 Tex. Crim. 559, 26 S. W. 2d 652 (1930);
(Continued on next page)
Jan., 1967
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol16/iss1/6
IN LOCO PARENTIS DEFENSE
permanent injury resulted from the defendant's act or unless the
act was done with malice, the defendant is within the rule's pro-
tection.3 3 Where the punishment is for an improper purpose or
is improper in itself, the rule will not apply.
34
Some states have enacted statutes covering the torturing or
punishing of another. The Ohio statute is typical of this type of
legislation and reads as follows:
No person shall torture, torment, or cruelly or unlawfully
punish another, or wilfully and negligently deprive him of
necessary food, clothing, or shelter.3 5
Where such laws are in effect, the courts have still allowed the
in loco parentis rule to be a defense and have followed either the
majority or the minority rule.3 6
Majority View of the In Loco Parentis Rule.
A parent or person in loco parentis, when inflicting punish-
ment, must not exceed the bounds of moderation and reasonable-
ness, and any acts that are cruel, merciless, unreasonable, and
immoderate are unlawful. 37 Various factors should be considered
in determining the reasonableness of an act. The following sum-
mary indicates what the courts have stated as being pertinent:
(1) The actor's relationship to the child; (2) the age of the
(Continued from preceding page)
Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 851, 44 S. E. 2d 419 (1947), parent may
punish but cannot exercise malevolence or the exhibition of uncontrolled
passion; Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 76 Am. Dec. 156 (1859), Court looked
to reasonable judgment of reasonable men to decide if punishment exces-
sive; Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366, 206 N. W. 173 (1925).
33 Dean v. State, 89 Ala. 46, 8 S. 38 (1890), in this case, excessiveness of
punishment alone will not convict; Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 S. 2d 49
(1954), follows the Dean case; Fox v. People, 84 Ill. App. 270 (1899);
People v. Green, 155 Mich. 524, 119 N. W. 1087 (1909), defendant caused
lasting mischief; Heritage v. Dodge, 64 N. H. 297, 9 A. 722 (1887), a teacher
is not liable for error in judgment where he acted in good faith and did not
cause permanent injury; State v. Jones, 95 N. C. 488, 59 Am. Rep. 282
(1886); State v. Stafford, 113 N. C. 635, 18 S. E. 256 (1893); State v. Lutz,
65 Ohio L. Abs. 402, 113 N. E. 2d 757 (C. P. 1953), mere excessive or
severe punishment is not enough to produce criminal liability on a teacher;
Commonwealth v. Ebert, 11 Pa. Dist. 199, 3 J. L. R. 252 (1901); State v.
McDonie, 89 W. Va. 185, 109 S. E. 710 (1921), rehear, den. (1921).
34 Annot., 89 A. L. R. 2d 399 (1963).
35 Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.18.
36 Martin v. State, 11 Ohio N. P. (n. s.) 183, 21 Ohio Dec. 520 (C. P.
1910), affd., 87 Ohio St. 459, 102 N. E. 1132 (1912), the court stated that
under a statute which restricted punishing a child under sixteen cruelly,
liability depended on malice or permanent injury being shown; People v.
Curtiss, 116 Cal. App. 771, 300 P. 801 (1931); State v. Henggeler, 312 Mo. 15,
278 S. W. 743 (1925); Fields v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 545, 272 S. W. 2d 520
(Crim. App. 1954).
37 People v. Curtiss, supra n. 36; Clasen v. Pruhs, supra n. 32; Stanfield v.
State, 43 Tex. 167 (1875); Patterson v. Nutter, 78 Me. 509, 7 A. 273 (1886);
Lander v. Seaver, supra n. 32; Hinkle v. State, supra n. 32; Steber v.
Norris, supra n. 32; State v. Spiegel, 39 Wyo. 309, 270 P. 1064 (1928).
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child; (3) the child's sex; (4) the child's physical and mental
condition; (5) the nature of the offense and apparent motive;
(6) whether the punishment or confinement is reasonably neces-
sary and appropriate; (7) whether the punishment is dispropor-
tionate to the offense; (8) whether the punishment is necessarily
degrading; (9) whether the punishment is likely to cause per-
manent injury or serious harm; (10) whether the punishment
was inflicted for a salutary purpose; (11) whether the actors
were free from malice; (12) the child's example on other chil-
dren; (13) the kind of instrument used; (14) the extent or nature
of the use of the instrument; (15) the sensitivity of the child;
(16) the child's responsibilities; (17) the child's tolerance to pain;
(18) and whether the child was old enough to understand the
punishment.38
In State v. Hunt,39 it was held that conduct is unreasonable
where the person ceases to act in good faith and with the idea
of correction, and acts with a malicious desire to inflict pain
rather than to correct. The reasonableness of an act is a question
of fact for the jury and if the evidence supports the verdict, the
court will not change it.40 Under the majority rule, there is no
presumption of the correctness of the defendant's act.4 1
In Clasen v. Pruhs,4 2 the Supreme Court of Nebraska fol-
.owed the majority view. In an earlier case, the court upheld
a verdict of guilty because a defendant in loco parentis struck
a nine year old child on the side of the face and ear with her
hand. Some days later the child's face and ear were still in-
flamed and swollen when examined by a physician.4 3 In another
case, a stepmother beat a child's head against a wall and was
subsequently convicted. 44
In Willman v. State,4 5 the court held it was not necessary that
the jury should believe the punishment was moderate. How-
ever if the jury should have a reasonable doubt as to the ex-
cessiveness of the punishment, they must acquit the defendant.46
38 Annot, 2 Am. Jur., Proof of Facts, Par. 2, Assault and Battery Proof, and
par. 7; Restatement (2d), Torts, par. 150 (1965); State v. Hunt, supra n. 32;
State v. Straight, supra n. 32; State v. Henggeler, 312 Mo. 15, 278 S. W. 743
(1925).
39 Supra n. 32.
40 State v. Spiegel, supra n. 37; Clasen v. Pruhs, supra n. 32; State v. Black,
360 Mo. 261, 227 S. W. 2d 1006 (1950); State v. Straight, supra n. 32; State
v. Washington, 104 La. 443, 29 S. 55 (1900); Hornbeck v. State, 16 Ind. App.
484, 45 N. E. 620 (1896); Hinkle v. State, supra n. 32.
41 State v. Straight, supra n. 32. A statute providing that the use of force
by one in loco parentis to correct, if reasonable, has been held not to per-
mit a presumption that the punishment was necessary and reasonable.
42 Supra n. 32.
43 Whitner v. State, 46 Neb. 144, 64 N. W. 704 (1895).
44 Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961 (1901).
45 63 Tex. Crim. 623, 141 S. W. 110 (1911).
46 State v. Koonse, supra n. 32; State v. Henggeler, supra n. 38.
Jan., 1967
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol16/iss1/6
IN LOCO PARENTIS DEFENSE
In Texas a defendant was guilty of assault and battery for
hanging his nine year old step-son upside down and then pro-
ceeding to beat him.47 Virginia courts have followed the same
rule.4s In Rowe v. Rugg,4 9 a mother was found to have the au-
thority to grant to another the right to punish her child, even
though the father was alive and living in the household.
Minority View of the In Loco Parentis Rule
A parent or one in loco parentis acts in a judicial or quasi-
judicial capacity. When he punishes a child, he is not liable for
criminal assault because of an error in judgment or because it
may appear to a fact finder that the punishment was not in line
with the offense of the child. 50 A person becomes liable for such
an offense only upon evidence that the punishment resulted in
permanent injury or was inflicted with malice, express (i.e.,
with spite, hate, ill will, passion, anger, or motives of revenge),
or implied (i.e., with wantonness or recklessness), and not in
good faith and for purposes of correction.51
Alabama courts hold that the state must show the existence
of malice or permanent injury and that the nature of the instru-
ment used and the attending circumstances may be considered
to show malice. 52 A verdict of guilty was affirmed against a man
who beat a child for an hour with a rubber belt for wetting.
He admitted he had lost his head, and this was evidence of
malice.5 3
The use of a weapon, to be deadly, does not have to be deadly
per se. It may become deadly through the manner of use.54
In State v. Jones,5 5 the court said that if it allowed the jury
to decide what conduct should be considered severe or unreason-
able, it would be leaving the question of criminal liability to the
jury to decide without a proper rule of law to guide them. This
47 Moreno v. State, supra n. 32.
48 Carpenter v. Commonwealth, supra n. 32. A mother left her child with
a man and he beat the child.
49 Supra n. 32. The child's aunt had administered the punishment.
50 Cameron v. State, 24 Ala. App. 438, 136 So. 418 (1931).
51 Griffin, Limits of Parent's and Teacher's Authority to Inflict Corporal
Punishment, 15 Ohio St. L. J. 384 (1954); Restatement (2d), Torts, par. 147
(1965); Wharton, op. cit. supra n. 3; State v. Lutz, supra n. 33; teacher's
punishment of child left bruise marks on the buttocks, but this was not
permanent injury; Holmes v. State, 39 S. 569 (Ala. 1905); State v. Pender-
grass, 19 N. C. 365, 31 Am. Dec. 416 (1837); Commonwealth v. Seed, 5
Clark (Pa.) 78 (1851); Dowlen v. State, 14 Tex. App. 61, 4 Am. Crim. Rep.
49 (1883), this case construed a statute; Fox v. People, supra n. 33.
52 Dean v. State, supra n. 33; Haydon v. State, 15 Ala. App. 61, 72 S. 586
(1916).
53 Nicholas v. State, 32 Ala. App. 574, 28 S. 2d 422 (1946).
54 State v. Cauley, 244 N. C. 701, 94 S. E. 2d 915 (1956).
55 Supra n. 33.
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would subject every exercise of parental correction of children
to the supervision and control of jurors. Another court, in de-
fining malice, felt it was correct to instruct the jury that gen-
eral malice is wickedness, a disposition to do wrong, and a black
and diabolical heart acting regardless of social duty and bent on
mischief.5G
In People v. Green,57 a father who charged his twelve-year-
old daughter with stealing, beat her with a whip, tied her hands
behind her back, and left her in a room for three or four days,
was convicted of assault and battery. The court stated that
when the chastisement is cruel and unreasonable so as to
negate the idea of good faith and shows evil passion, malice
is established.
In State v. McDonie,58 a stepfather beat his son to the point
of death. The boy was scalded in a hot tub of water. The court
held that if the treatment to which the son had been subjected
resulted in serious injury, that fact alone would justify a con-
clusion that the punishment was unreasonable and would tend
to show that the father acted with malice.
Rules Affecting Acts of a Teacher While in Loco Parentis
Teachers stand in loco parentis to pupils and their criminal
liability is determined on nearly the same basis as others who
stand in loco parentis. However, other rules which have a bear-
ing on a teacher's liability for assault and battery supplement
the majority and minority views.
Since a teacher may punish a child for disobeying a school
rule, deciding whether the rule is reasonable or valid is a ques-
tion of law for the court.59 A rule requiring pupils to pay for
school property which they may wantonly or carelessly break
or destroy is not a reasonable rule, and therefore not one which
a teacher may enforce by chastisement.6 0 In Anderson v.
State,6 1 a boy who was new in school accidentally spoke out of
turn. He apologized to the teacher but was still hit several times
with a large stick. The court found insufficient cause for the
punishment and held the teacher had used unauthorized force.
In another Tennessee case, a boy went into the school and
opened all the windows and was punished for so doing. The
56 State v. Atkins, 242 N. C. 294, 87 S. E. 2d 507 (1955).
57 Supra n. 33.
58 Supra n. 33.
59 Fertich v. Michener, 111 Ind. 472, 11 N. E. 605, 14 N. E. 68 (1887); State
v. Davis, 158 Iowa 501, 139 N. W. 1073 (1913), rule requiring pupil to carry
water not valid.
60 State v. Vanderbilt, 116 Ind. 11, 18 N. E. 266 (1888).
61 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 455 (1859).
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court allowed the teacher to show that the punishment was such
as was usual in the school and such as the parents might have ex-
pected their child to receive for doing wrong.6 2
A teacher may chastise a pupil for an act done away from
school if the act is a violation of a school rule and tends to de-
grade the teacher or affects the decorum or morale of the
school.6 3
The fact that the infliction of punishment results in injury
because of a pre-existing or unusual condition of the pupil is not
chargeable against a teacher when criminal liability is at issue
unless he knew or should have known of this condition.6 4
A pupil who has reached his majority and voluntarily at-
tends school subjects himself to school discipline.6 5
Various explanations have been offered in attempts to ex-
plain whether or not a teacher's authority to punish should be
on the same level as that of parents. In some cases, courts have
said that a parent has natural affections for the child which will
restrain him in his acts of punishment but that the teacher does
not have this same feeling, and thus the teacher cannot assume
he has the same right as a parent to punish. 6  Another view
considers that the teacher is impartial or contends that his edu-
cation softens his heart.6 7 According to another theory, the
parent delegates authority to the teacher, and thus the teacher's
authority can rise no higher than that of the parent. The weak-
ness of this latter theory is shown by the fact that attendance is
compulsory and thus the parent does not delegate any authority
at all.68 All of these theories are relatively unworkable. The
best solution for establishing the teacher's authority with respect
to corporal punishment is by following the in loco parentis rule
as construed by either the majority or minority view.6 9
62 Marlar v. Bill, 181 Tenn. 100, 178 S. W. 2d 634 (1944).
63 Lander v. Seaver, supra n. 32, a student cursed a schoolmaster after
school hours in front of other students; Hutton v. State, 23 Tex. App. 386,
5 S. W. 122 (1887), student punished for fighting with other boys away
from school; R. v. Newport (Salop) Justices, 2 K. B. 416 (1929); Jones v.
Cody, 132 Mich. 13, 92 N. W. 495 (1902), school stopped children from
loitering in candy store after school; Dann, Notes and Comments, 11 Cor-
nell L. Q. 266 (1926).
64 Ely v. State, 68 Tex. Crim. 562, 152 S. W. 631 (Crim. App. 1912); Quini
v. Nolan, 70 Dec. Rep. 585; 5 Ohio Jur. 2d 121, Assault and Battery, par. 21.
65 State v. Mizner, 45 Iowa 248 (1876).
66 Steber v. Norris, supra n. 32; Lander v. Seaver, supra n. 32.
67 Griffin, op. cit. supra n. 51; Commonwealth v. Seed, supra n. 51.
68 See, 1 Bishop, Criminal Law, par. 886 (9th ed. 1923); 26 fI1. L. Rev. 815
(1932).
69 Dodd v. State, 94 Ark. 297, 126 S. W. 834 (1910); Guyten v. Rhodes, 65
Ohio App. 163, 29 N. E. 2d 444 (1940); Miller, Resort to Corporal Punish-
ment in Enforcing School Discipline, 1 Syracuse L. Rev. 247 (1949); 48 Ohio
Jur. 2d 58, Schools, par. 176.
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Majority View As Applied to Teachers In Loco Parentis
A leading case following the majority view is People v.
Curtiss.70 A teacher and a principal were charged with the
violation of the penal code for punishing a child excessively. The
court's opinion stated that the court is to decide if the punish-
ment inflicted was justified, and the existence of permanent in-
jury is not a necessary element to sustain criminal liability.
There is no distinction in the application of the test between
punishment and acts of restraint incident to punishment. A
teacher put his knee on the stomach of a pupil and sat on him
while waiting for the boy's older sister to come and take him
home. This act of restraint was held to be unreasonable.7 1
To prove assault and battery, it must be shown that a wrong
was intentionally committed. The criminal intent of the teacher
may be inferred from the unreasonableness of the method
adopted or the excess of the force employed. The state has the
burden of proof. 72
As in other criminal matters, the teacher is presumed in-
nocent and the state has the unshifting burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.7  The teacher may introduce evi-
dence of the habitual misconduct of the pupil prior to his
punishment in support of the reasonableness of his act.7 4
Finally, in Territory v. Cox, 7 5 the court stated that a teacher
can cause a pupil a reasonable amount of temporary pain and
the mere fact that marks and temporary pain result from the
punishment inflicted, without any other evidence from which un-
reasonableness can be implied, will not support a conviction.
Minority Rule As Applied to Teachers In Loco Parentis
The minority rule allows teachers to inflict temporary pain
upon a pupil without being criminally liable the same as the ma-
jority view.76 However, as with the parents under the minority
rule and unlike the majority view, there is a presumption of
the correctness of the teacher's act which must be overcome by
a showing of malice or permanent injury.77
When a teacher hit his pupil with his fist and then a tree
limb and shouted he would kill him, it was held this was suf-
ficient to show legal malice.78
70 Supra n. 36.
71 Calway v. Williamson, 130 Conn. 575, 36 A. 2d 377 (1944).
72 Van Vactor v. State, 113 Ind. 276, 15 N. E. 341 (1888).
73 People v. Mummert, 183 Mis. 243, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 699 (1944).
74 Sheehan v. Sturges, 53 Conn. 481, 2 A. 841 (1885).
75 24 Hawaii 461 (1918).
76 State v. Pendergrass, supra n. 51.
77 Fox v. People, supra n. 33.
78 Boyd v. State, 88 Ala. 169, 7 So. 268 (1890).
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IN LOCO PARENTIS DEFENSE
The fact that the punishment is unnecessarily excessive,
without a showing of malice or permanent injury, is not enough
to produce criminal liability under the minority view.
7 9
Conclusion
The idea of correction must not be confused with the con-
stant abuse of a child. A rule that finds criminal liability only
upon a showing of permanent injuries or malice gives rise to
such confusion. Anytime one person strikes another it is a
serious matter, and especially if the person may not have any re-
course under the law. The minority rule, requiring permanent
injury or malice, does not protect a child from the constant
harassment which may be more abusive than permanent in-
jury. Public policy demands that the courts use a strong hand
to protect children from any acts of unreasonable violence. The
majority view is the most effective tool courts have for such
purpose. It allows the public, through the jury, to decide how
far a person standing in loco parentis should be allowed to go
when inflicting corporal punishment. Under no circumstances
should the person in loco parentis be the final arbitrator of
what is and what is not excessive. It is the child's welfare that
the courts must be concerned with, and a conviction for assault
and battery should not depend on the showing of malice or
whether the child was permanently injured.
79 Drake v. Thomas, 310 Ill. App. 57, 33 N. E. 2d 889 (1941); Heritage v.
Dodge, supra n. 33, a teacher is not liable for error of judgment if punish-
ment is inflicted in good faith and without malice; Commonwealth v. Ebert,
supra n. 33.
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